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Jllon verb for the edible mushrooms. The same learning takes 
place for three categories of toadstools. An important aspect of 
such a model is that researchers do not impose a predefined lexi-
con. Instead, each population evolves its own set of meanings and 
the corresponding Signals. This is achieved through the dynamic 
learning interactions between children and parents, and through 
the interdependence between the evolving behavioral abilities 
(e.g., categorization of mushrooms) and the learned linguistic 
skills. 
The simulation results showed that populations evolve shared 
lexicons that optimally facilitate the foraging task. The majority of 
such languages are compositional. They contain two words to 
name the action (e.g., avoid/ approach) and three words to name 
the three individual categories of mushrooms. To test whether 
these apparent compositional languages are actually based on real 
symbolic relationships, a symbol acquisition test, similar to that in 
Savage-Rumbaugh and Rumbaugh's (1978) chimpanzee experi-
ments, was used. The test consisted of three learning stages. In the 
first stage, organisms learn to label only four foods (two edible and 
two poisonous mushrooms). Subsequently, they learn to associate 
the four names with two new verbs. In the final stage, the names 
of the remaining two foods are taught. The association with pre-
vious verbs is not expliCitly taught because, in a real symbolic lan-
guage, the lOgical relationship between new names and verbs is 
expected to be made by generalization. Data showed that the ma-
jority of populations successfully generalize the association of 
verbs with new names, thus demonstrating that a real symbolic 
language has been acquired. 
This simulation shows that it is possible to build autonomous 
agent models that manifest behavioral, cognitive, and neural phe-
nomena similar to those observed in experimental studies. In ad-
dition to sharing with new ape language research the benefits of a 
dynamical system paradigm, this modeling approach provides 
other advantages . This is espeCially true in the field of language 
origin research. Computational models require that language ori-
gin theories be defined in clear operational terms (necessary to 
implement the computer program) so that hypotheses can be ver-
ified during simulation (Cangelosi & Parisi 2002). Autonomous 
agent models permit the simulation of past language origin sce-
narios by manipulating various evolutionary, behavioral, neural , 
and social variables. This also helps in overcoming the limits of 
other computational approaches, such as classical connectionism 
(Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), which can only study ontoge-
netic changes. Finally, constraining the models to known empiri-
cal facts related to language evolution (Tomasello 2002) produces 
a virtuous circle. Models generate new predictions and inSights, 
and subsequent experimental studies verifY them and generate 
new predictions, which can be tested again in simulation. 
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Abstract: Dynamic systems theory is a way of describing the patterns that 
emerge from relationships in the universe. In the study of interpersonal 
relationships, within and between species, the scientist is an active and 
engaged participant in those relationships. Separation between self and 
other, scientist and subject, runs counter to systems thinking and creates 
an unnecessary divide between humans and animals. 
What does it mean to have an individual mind? One could say it 
means to have the ability to think and reason, to make decisions 
independently of others, and to have a unique pOint of view and 
the ability to formulate intentions and actions consistent with that 
point of view. But most human minds work along the channels of 
thought and reason acquired by speaking and acting with other 
people (Piaget 1965; Vygotsky 1978). Our "private," "original," 
and "independent" thoughts are always phrased in culturallexi-
cons of imagery, myth and story, gesture, language, or mathemat-
ical formalism. To demonstrate the independence of our minds, 
we say things, do things, and build things with words, gestures, and 
materials that are sociocultural in origin. 
Being-in-relation, participating in an interpersonal relation-
ship, is a fundamental , irreducible, primary, way of being. Indi-
viduals are born into interpersonal relationships. We never, not for 
a Single moment of life, exist outside of relationships even when 
we are phYSically alone. Our thoughts, our movements, the arti-
facts carried with us are all grounded in cultural processes that 
were conceived, composed, and codified by individuals-in-rela-
tion (Fogel 1993). 
It is ironic, then, that Western cultural and linguistic imagery 
gives the illusion that individual minds take precedence over be-
ing-in-relation. As scientists of mind and communication, we can 
use the cultural lexicon to distinguish human and animal worlds, 
self and other, inner and outer, emotion and cognition, and verbal 
and nonverbal. On the other hand, as human beings immersed in 
the act of communicating, such distinctions become arbitrary and 
meaningless . Shanker & King (S&K) suggest that we can either 
gain knowledge about the phenomenon under study or - by our 
own experience - gain intimate knowledge of the same phenom-
enon (James 1890). Is it possible to be a scientist while relating to 
our subject matter as a fully participating human being? 
S&K compare and contrast two paradigms aimed at answering 
such scientific inquiries . They observe the behavior of individual-
istic world-view thinkers who come back from their solitary jour-
neys into the mind and attempt to communicate their inSights. 
Deacon is chosen to represent this style of science, studying phe-
nomena from a distance, attempting to break them into indepen-
dent parts, and subsequently reassembling tllem into a model of 
reality. Deacon is asking, 'What are the limitations of an ape's lan-
guage capacities? What abilities for communication does an ape 
have?" 
Savage-Rumbaugh, on the other hand, was not content to ap-
proach apes from a distance. She asked, "What are the possibili-
ties for connection between me and Kanzi? How can I change my-
self in order to deepen the relationship between us?" Kanzi and 
the other apes become active pmticipants in a courageously alive 
interpersonal relationship - not separate minds contemplated 
from afar. Savage-Rumbaugh entered the apes ' world by altering 
her behavior both phYSically and emotionally. She gave the apes 
the opportunity and tools to communicate, learn, and grow with a 
wonderfully engaged partner. By allOwing herself to be moved and 
changed, she demonstrated the emergence of communicative 
capabilities in nonhuman species in ways that were heretofore 
unimagined. 
The fundamentally different paradigms of Deacon and Savage-
Rumbaugh represent different theoretical approaches: informa-
tion processing versus dynamiC systems. These paradigms also af-
ford entirely different kinds of knowledge: knowledge from reason 
and knowledge from the fully human experience of direct en-
gagement. 
Dynamic systems perspectives assume a fundamental related-
ness at the heart of the universe, implying that the scientific ob-
server is part of this relatedness. But this raises a central question. 
Having gone into a direct relationship with the apes, what kind of 
a scientific story can be told? From a dynamic systems perspec-
tive, it is sufficient to know with whom, how, and under what con-
ditions individuals can relate with and connect to each other. For 
example, Smuts (2001) described surprising and mutually enrich-
ing encounters with creatures as diverse as dogs, baboons, birds, 
and rodents that emerged from the scientists' "sensitivity and hu-
mility" (p. 301 ). 
Dynamic systems is not a new behaviorism. It is not uninter-
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ested in mental and emotional processes. Rather, dynamic systems 
suggests that knowledge of the other can arise only in relation to 
the other. Acts of separation run countcr to dynamic systems 
thinking, creating a sense of human versus apes rather than hu-
mans with apes. Thinking about the ape's mind in the absence of 
a close relationship is not the same as the direct experience of an-
other mind through sharing actions and feelings, such as playing 
games with mutual delight or aligning intentions to achieve a 
common goal. These shared experiences give the observer a sense 
of direct certainty that she is engaging with another intentional 
being. 
We now know that Kanzi and other bonobos can - with an cn-
gaged human partner - comprehend spoken English, produce 
English-based speech sounds, make stone tools, and ,vrite lexical 
symbols (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2001). It is difficult to imagine 
how these scientific discoveries could have been made outside of 
a relationship of engagement and Illutual commitment between 
scientist and ape. Thc theory arises from this obscrvation. Com-
municative skills like language and gesture, within and between 
species, can only emerge by engaging in meaningful interpersonal 
relationships built up over time (Bruner 1983; Fogel 1993). The 
telling of what happened in those remarkable relationships is all 
one needs to know in order to replicate the findings - that is, to 
recreate a similar relationship. 
But this is not the whole story. As Kanzi and the other apes 
changed in relation to the scientists, thosc scientists changed in re-
lation to the apes. Instead of being humans who viewcd animals 
as separate and different, they became humans who changed thci r 
ways in order to invite animals into the realm of engaged, intelli-
gent, feeling beings. This is a form of moral courage: to open our 
own minds to change, to expand what it means to be human by 
acts of love that transcend the ordinary. 
